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Abstract
Widely publicized reports of fresh MBAs receiving multiple job offers with
six-figure annual salaries leave a long-lasting general impression about the high
quality of selected business schools. Business Week reports on a regular basis
ranking of MBA programs based on subjective surveys of students and employers.
This paper ranks MBA programs using objective data from three different points
of view students, employers, and MBA program administrators.
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1. Introduction 
Since 1988, Business Week biennially publishes a list of the top-ranked business schools in the U.S. 
This ranking reflects survey questionnaire responses from corporate recruiters, on the one hand, 
and current and recent graduates, on the other. Apart from enhancing the prestige of individual 
MBA programs, this ranking can significantly influence popular perception about the quality of the 
MBAs from different schools and, thus, affect their starting salaries. Survey results, however, rely 
on both subjective and objective factors.  
Subjective factors may incorporate a prestige factor based on past accomplishments by an 
MBA program not actually reflected in its current experience. Reputations reflect hard-won 
achievements, but also seem impervious to change from new challengers. In other words, 
reputation embodies “capital” that is difficult to squander, once achieved. Moreover, the survey 
respondents’ perception of the objective factors may prove erroneous. In sum, the perceptions 
recorded in survey findings may significantly differ from the objective facts. This paper ranks 
MBA programs on numerous objective factors and compares those “objective” rankings to the 
“subjective” rankings of the Business Week survey results. 
The ranking of MBA programs may differ depending on the target audience. MBA students may 
value different criteria for ranking programs as compared to employers. Such variables as increase in 
salary from pre- to post-MBA program and the number of job offers post-MBA program reflect the 
interests of the MBA students. Employers, on the other hand, may value such factors as the selectivity of 
MBA programs, the GMAT scores of entering students, the faculty-student ratio, and the program’s 
budget. Of course, since the MBA programs must serve both the students and the employers, program 
administrators should value both sets of factors. 
Conceptually, a professional education produces the stock of marketable human capital of 
the individuals graduating from the program. Although far from perfect, the salary offer received 
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on graduation provides a reasonable index of the market value of that human capital. Students enter 
the MBA programs, however, with varying initial stocks of human capital. Pre-MBA earnings 
provide an index of the human capital acquired prior to entering the program. Thus, the incremental 
contribution of the program measures the differential between the pre- and post-MBA annual 
earnings, after adjusting for the cost of attending the MBA program. 
Tracy and Waldfogel (1997) rank business schools employing what they call the “market-based” 
approach. Using regression analysis, they determine the value added by an MBA program, which they 
then use to rank MBA programs.1 The Tracy-Waldfogel ranking provides important information to MBA 
students. But it does not provide good information to employers or MBA program administrators. For 
example, a high-value-added program may start with lower quality students. Thus, employers may not 
find a high ranking that helpful. In other words, while value added may provide important information to 
MBA students, the total value may represent more valuable information to employers. And what is most 
important in total value, holding the MBA education value-added constant, is the quality of the inputs 
used in the production process. 
Reputational ranking of a business school primarily reflects popular perception of its 
graduates in their post-MBA careers. The starting pay package by itself does not accurately reflect 
the success level of a school.2 Most top-rated MBA programs admit only students with high 
                                                 
1 They distinguish between the quality of an MBA program and the quality of its students. They regress the average 
starting salary (adjusted for differences in cost-of-living) on a number of student attributes and interpret the residual 
as value added by the program. Their revised ranking of MBA programs does contain a few surprises in that side by 
side with the heavyweights like Stanford, Harvard, and Chicago, much less recognized programs such as Oklahoma 
State, New Mexico, and Wake Forest feature in their “Value-Added Top 10” list. 
2 For example, Harvard MBAs report average starting base salary of $90,675 and a total compensation package worth 
$163,792 (including other compensation of  $51,917 and a one time signing bonus of $21,200) for the graduating class 
of 1998. For the graduates of Marriott School of Business at Brigham Young University (BYU), the corresponding 
average base salary and total compensation package equal $66,789 and $99,180, respectively. What is seldom 
mentioned is that the average pre-MBA salary of Harvard’s graduating class already equals a high value of $68,000 and 
a much more modest $27,684 at BYU. In fact, when accounting for differences in tuition and other expenses, the 
annuitized value of the gain in earnings for BYU graduates exceeds that for the Harvard graduates. 
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GMAT scores. Thus, their graduates are pre-selected for a successful post-MBA career. In sum, the 
extent of "value added" is often overstated.  
Good management education should produce efficient managers. Efficient management of 
production requires optimal utilization of resources. Efficiency is inconsistent with either 
unrealized potential increase in output or avoidable waste of inputs. To what extent do these top 
rated MBA programs practice what they preach? More specifically, do these MBA programs 
themselves, when viewed as production units, efficiently use their resources? 
Decision making problems parallel production processes, where desirable outcomes of the 
decision play the role of outputs while actions or conditions facilitating these outcomes play the 
role of inputs. One important variables measures how business schools widens the difference 
between the post-MBA and pre-MBA salaries of its graduates. Also, the number of job offers 
provides another output dimension. Inputs, on the other hand, include faculty and other resources 
employed as well as the quality of the entering class. Other factors, such as the gender ratio and the 
proportion of international students, can affect the outputs, and therefore they may enter as inputs 
in an appropriately specified model.  
Ray and Jeon (2003) broaden the discussion of MBA program reputation or ranking to 
include production efficiency. Employing a production model and data envelopment analysis 
(DEA), they examine the reputation and production efficiency of MBA programs.3 4 The 
                                                 
3 Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) introduce the DEA method to non-parametrically measure technical efficiency 
of production units with reference to a technology exhibiting constant returns to scale. Subsequently, Banker, Charnes, 
and Cooper (1984) generalize the model to accommodate variable returns to scale. The data come from the following 
web site: http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/index.html.  
4 A number of studies use DEA to examine production and efficiency in education. Johnes and Johnes (1993) 
employ DEA to measure research efficiency of a number of Economics departments from British universities based on 
publication and personnel data collected by the Royal Economic Society. Burton and Phimister (1994) apply DEA to 
evaluate efficiency of a set of "core journals" identified by Diamond (1989). Breu and Raab (1994) analyze the data 
from the Top-25 National universities and Liberal Arts colleges to measure their efficiency levels using DEA. They 
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production process combines inputs to produce outputs. The calculation of a most efficient 
frontier then allows the computation of production efficiency for each of the MBA programs in 
the sample. Efficiency is measured in three ways – output-oriented, input-oriented, and global 
efficiency measures. Output-oriented efficiency determines by how much one can technically 
increase output, using the observed inputs. Input-oriented efficiency determines by how much 
one can technically reduce inputs to produce the observed outputs. Finally, the global efficiency 
measure determines how much one can technically increase outputs and decrease inputs 
simultaneously to produce on the production frontier. 
Similar to Tracy and Waldfogel (1997) and Ray and Jeon (2003), we also use objectively 
measured “inputs” and “outputs” rather than subjective scores based on survey responses to rank 
the individual MBA programs. As explained below, we use net salary gain measured by the 
difference between pre- and post-MBA salaries adjusted for tuition and fees as one component of 
the output bundle that also includes the average number of job offers received by a typical 
graduate of a program as another component. We use a number of student characteristics 
alongside a number of variables representing MBA program resources as inputs. 
This paper explores the reputation or ranking of MBA programs using several 
approaches. First, we develop three rankings based on simple averages of individual rankings 
across the outputs, across the inputs, and across a simple combination of outputs and inputs. 
Those rankings reflect our categorization of who cares about what. That is, MBA students will 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
find that several of the best-rated universities like Cal Tech (rated 5th) and Chicago (rated 10th) operate at less than 
90% efficiency. Colbert, Levary and Shaner (1999) determine an alternative ranking of U.S. MBA programs based 
on DEA using the survey response scores reported in the Business Week study. They also compare the U.S. 
programs with three foreign MBA programs. As pointed out by Tracy and Waldfogel (1997), a valid ranking should 
incorporate objective criteria that are comparable across programs and should also be based on “outputs” rather than 
“inputs”. The Colbert, Levary, and Shaner (1999) study, like the original Business Week ranking, falls short on this 
count. 
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focus on the outputs ranking, employers on the inputs ranking, and the MBA program 
administrators on a combination of outputs and inputs ranking. Second, we also report rankings 
developed by Ray and Jeon (2003) based on production efficiency – output-oriented, input-
oriented, and global efficiency. Here again, MBA students focus on the output-oriented 
efficiency ranking, employers focus on the input-oriented efficiency ranking, and the MBA 
program administers focus on the global efficiency ranking. Finally, we combine the first two 
rankings by simple averages to generate our most comprehensive rankings. 
2. Data Definitions and Descriptive Analysis of MBA Programs 
In this study, we consider two outputs and six inputs contained in the business school production 
process.5 The first output (gain) measures the difference between the annuitized pre- and post-
MBA earnings flow of a representative graduate of the school, which we treat as the value added. 
Management education helps the students acquire and develop various management skills, which 
make them more valuable to subsequent employers. Therefore, in an efficient market, a graduate 
with better skills relevant for effective management should receive a higher salary. The second 
output equals the adjusted placement rate (jobs). More worthy candidates usually generate multiple 
job offers. Given that the job placement rate does not reach 100%, however, the average number of 
offers received by the graduates who actually get any offer is adjusted by the probability that a 
graduating student has an offer in hand. 
The six inputs include: (i) the faculty-student ratio (f/s), (ii) the average GMAT score of the 
incoming class (gmat), (iii) the degree of selectivity in the admission process measured by the 
percentage of applications rejected (%reject), (iv) the expenditure per student (ex/stud), (v) the 
                                                 
5 All data come from the Ray and Jeon (2003), who use the Business Week data to calculate the outputs and inputs 
for their analysis. The Appendix provides more details on data definitions and construction. 
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percentage of male students in the class (%male), and (vi) the percentage of U.S. students in the 
class (%US). The faculty-student ratio measures an important school input. An increase in the 
faculty-student ratio should contribute positively to the output bundle. The student's background is 
measured in two alternative ways. One measure equals the percentage of applicants rejected for 
admission by a school. The more selective the school is, the higher is its rejection rate and the 
better is the quality of its graduating students. Self-selection, however, may occur in the applicant 
pools across MBA programs, where better applicants target only the more reputed MBA programs 
(like Pennsylvania or Northwestern). In that case, the second quartile of the pool of applicants for 
one school may include better applicants than the top quartile for another. Hence, an eighty-percent 
rejection rate for both MBA programs does not imply the same quality of the students admitted. An 
alternative selectivity measures equals the average gmat scores of the in-coming class across MBA 
programs. In this study, we include both measures of student quality as inputs. Finally, ex/stud 
measures resources spent (expenditure) per student. 
When developing efficiency measures for the MBA programs, Ray and Jeon (2003) employ 
two additional input control variables.6 Those two demographic variables, %male and %US, reflect 
characteristics of the students that may affect their salaries without affecting their managerial 
ability. Due to family constraints, a female MBA exhibits less mobility than the male MBA 
counterpart in her class, implying that her starting salary is lower, on average. Also, a gender bias 
may exist against female graduates in the market. For both reasons, a school with a higher 
proportion of female students may experience a lower expected salary increase (pre- vs. post-
MBA). Similar logic applies for a school with a higher proportion of international students. Often, 
due to visa problems, MBAs who are not U.S. residents accept jobs that pay lower than average. 
                                                 
6 The appendix also provides a simple example of calculating the global efficiency measure. 
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On the other hand, outstanding MBAs who are foreign nationals may return to their own countries. 
As a result, the average salaries of those who accept employment in the U.S. are probably lower. 
By including the inputs %male and %US, we control for these two "qualitative dimensions" of the 
student input. 
Table 1 reports the input-output data for the individual MBA programs used in this study 
and the group-wise average values. The MBA programs are listed according to their ranking in the 
Business Week list. They are grouped into 3 categories – tier-1 MBA programs consist of the top-
25 programs, tier-2 MBA programs include the next 25 programs, and tier-3 MBA programs 
contain the last 11 programs. On average, the MBA programs from a higher category achieve 
higher salary gain and a better placement record than MBA programs from a lower category. At the 
individual school level, Carnegie Mellon University shows the highest gain ($43,376), closely 
followed by New York University ($43,354). At the other end, University of Florida shows a 
modest gain of $21,636. In terms of placement, Purdue University with 4.1 job offers per graduate 
proves most successful, while SUNY -- Buffalo and Thunderbird with only 1.5 offers per graduate 
show the poorest performance. Examining school resources, the top-25 MBA programs possess a 
substantially lower faculty-student ratio than the programs in the other categories while the tier-2 
programs exhibit a substantially lower expenditure per student compared to the other two 
categories. Georgia Tech, with an expenditure level of $173,054, towers over all others. Tulane, 
University of Georgia, Harvard, and University of Pennsylvania also spend in excess of $100,000 
per student. University of Tennessee, Knoxville spends a mere $3,400 per student. South Carolina 
spending of $9,400 per pupil was the second lowest. MBA programs in higher categories exhibit, 
as expected, more selective classes with both higher average GMAT scores and higher rejection 
rates. Stanford accepts only 7% of the applicants and enrolls a class with an average GMAT score 
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of 722. At the other extreme, Clark -- Atlanta (ranked 54th) with a rejection rate nearly 30% 
possesses an average GMAT score of only 430. The proportion of US students does not move 
much (between 72 and 74%), on average, across all three categories. Compared to the other 
categories, tier-3 MBA programs possess a higher proportion of female students (34%). 
3. Constructing and Interpreting Alternative Rankings of MBA Programs 
As noted above, the Business Week rankings of MBA programs uses surveys of students and 
employers to measure their combined perceptions of the quality of MBA programs. We argue that 
the combining of surveys, including students and employers, mixes apples and oranges. In this 
section, we develop objective rankings of MBA programs that address the interests of students, 
employers, and MBA program administrators separately. Moreover, we compare those “objective” 
rankings with the “subjective” Business Week rankings.  
First, consider the interests of the students, which, we argue, reflect the value added (gain) 
and the number of job offers (jobs) produced by MBA programs, our output measures. We ranked 
the MBA programs based on value added and job offers separately. Then we took a simple average 
of the rankings on these two dimensions and ranked the resulting outcomes to generate an overall 
output ranking. Table 2 reports the findings.7 The last column of Table 2 reports the difference 
between the Business Week ranking and the overall output ranking. 
Focusing on the overall output ranking, Dartmouth (-27), Arizona (-26), Babson (-22), 
Harvard (-21), Pittsburgh (-21), and Wisconsin -- Madison (-20) drop 20 or more positions from 
their Business Week results.8 For example, Harvard falls from 5th to 26th, a loss of 21 places. But, 
                                                 
7 Spearman rank correlations between the Business Week ranking and our value added, job offers, and overall output 
rankings equals 0.49, 0.60, and 0.66. respectively. 
8 The negative (positive) numbers in parentheses indicate the number of places lost (gained) when moving from the 
Business Week to the overall output ranking. 
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that fall reflects entirely the drop of 44 places in the value-added ranking, since Harvard actually 
rises 3 places in the job-offer ranking. At the same time, Minnesota (44), Clark -- Atlanta (33), 
Michigan State (26), Tulane (23), UC -- Irvine (23), Georgia Tech (21), and Purdue (20) rise 20 or 
more places when moving to the overall output ranking. For example, Minnesota rises from 57th in 
the Business Week ranking to 13th in the overall output ranking. Finally, note that the overall 
ranking moves Carnegie Mellon into the number one spot, followed in order by MIT, Michigan, 
Purdue, and Duke. 
Second, consider the interests of the employer, which, we argue, reflect the faculty-student 
ratio (f/s), the rejection percentage (%reject), the GMAT score (gmat), and the expenditure per 
student (ex/stud) invested by the MBA program into the pool of students attracted to the MBA 
program, given their screening devices. As we did for our output measures, we rank MBA 
programs based on each individual input. Next, we take a simple average of those input rankings 
and generate an overall input ranking. Then, we compare our “objective” rankings with the 
“subjective” rankings from the Business Week survey.9 Table 3 reports the findings. Once again, 
the last column reports the difference between the Business Week ranking and our overall input 
ranking. 
The ranking of MBA programs based on individual inputs generates an interesting 
observation. Higher rejection percentages or higher GMAT scores associate with a higher Business 
Week ranking. That is, higher ranked MBA programs prove much more selective in admitting 
                                                 
9 Spearman rank correlations between the Business Week ranking and our faculty-student ratio, the rejection 
percentage, the GMAT score, the expenditure per student, and overall input rankings equal 0.39, 0.70, 0.73, 0.30, 
and 0.69, respectively. The higher correlations for the rankings based on rejection percentages and the GMAT 
scores probably echo the MBA-program-specific information contained in those two variables. That is, the faculty-
student and expenditure-student ratios incorporate school-wide rather than MBA-program-specific information. 
Nonetheless, the overall input ranking correlation nearly matches the correlations for the rankings based on 
rejection percentages and GMAT scores. 
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students into their programs, not a surprise. Also, higher expenditure per student associates with a 
higher Business Week ranking. Unexpectedly, a lower faculty-student ratio associates with a higher 
Business Week ranking. We interpret this observation as follows. Higher ranked MBA programs in 
the Business Week rankings select students with high ability and promise. Moreover, a low faculty-
student ratio implies, on average, a large MBA program. Thus, employers can pick from a large 
pool of extremely promising students. Conversely, a large faculty-student ratio may signal a small 
MBA program with many fewer students in any graduating class.10 
Focusing on the overall input ranking, Wisconsin -- Madison (-35), Arizona (-26), Illinois -
- Urbana/Champaign (-26), BYU (-24), and Purdue (-20) drop 20 or more positions from their 
Business Week results. For example, Wisconsin -- Madison falls from 23rd to 58th, a loss of 35 
places. That fall reflects nearly equal decreases in ranking across all four input measure, albeit that 
the smallest decrease associates with the faculty-student ratio where the decrease in positions only 
equals 16. At the same time, Washington -- Seattle (42), UC -- Irvine (29), UC -- Davis (28), 
Rochester (24), and Vanderbilt (21) rise 20 or more places when moving to the overall output 
ranking. For example, Washington -- Seattle rises from 61st in the Business Week ranking to 19th in 
the overall input ranking. Finally, note that the overall ranking keeps Pennsylvania and 
Northwestern in the number one and two positions, respectively, that they also enjoy in the 
Business Week rankings Stanford moves up to 3rd place followed in order by Harvard and MIT. 
Third, consider the interests of MBA program administrators, which, we argue, reflect the 
interests of the students and employers. That is, program administrators consider both outputs and 
inputs. Now, we take the overall output and input rankings developed in Tables 2 and 3, 
                                                 
10 Examining the raw Business Week data on faculty and students, higher ranked MBA programs, on average, 
employ and enroll more faculty and students, respectively, although the enrollment of students rises more rapidly 
than employment of faculty so that the faculty student ratio falls. 
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respectively, calculate a simple average of those two rankings, and produce a combined ranking 
that includes both outputs and inputs.11 Since the Business Week method uses surveys of students 
and employees, that ranking, in spirit, comes the closest to our combined ranking. The crucial 
difference, however, remains – our ranking uses “objective” data while the Business Week survey 
incorporates “subjective” judgment. Table 4 reports the findings of the combined ranking as well as 
the difference between the Business Week ranking and our combined ranking. 
Focusing on the combined ranking, Wisconsin -- Madison (-32), Babson (-25), and Illinois 
-- Urbana/Champaign (-25) drop 20 or more positions from their Business Week results. For 
example, Wisconsin -- Madison falls from 23rd to 55th, a loss of 32 places. At the same time, UC -- 
Irvine (29), Washington -- Seattle (27), Minnesota (26), Georgia Tech (23), Tulane (21), and 
Rochester (24) rise 20 or more places when moving to the overall output ranking. Finally, note that 
the overall ranking moves MIT into the number one spot, followed in order by Northwestern, 
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Duke. That is, MIT makes a big move from 15th in the Business Week 
ranking to 1st in our combined ranking while Northwestern maintains its number two position. 
Fourth, the administrator can also evaluate an MBA program as a production process. 
Efficient production requires the maximum outputs from a given set of inputs or the minimum 
inputs to produce a given set of outputs. As noted above, Ray and Jeon (2003) calculate MBA 
program efficiency, using output-oriented, input-oriented, and global efficiency measures. That 
methodology tries to increase outputs, decrease inputs, or both simultaneously to achieve 
production efficiency.12 13 Table 5 reports rankings based on DEA efficiency calculations.14 Thirty 
                                                 
11 Spearman rank correlation between the Business Week ranking and our combined ranking equals 0.75. 
12 We already note that the faculty-student ratio associates with Business Week ranking in a counterintuitive fashion. 
That is, a lower faculty-student ratio associates with a higher ranking. The DEA methodology imposes the opposite 
movement on the faculty-student ratio for improving efficiency. In that sense, calculating production efficiency of 
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MBA programs exhibit no inefficiency in the output-oriented, input-oriented, and global efficiency 
measures. Thus, when ranking MBA programs by efficiency, those 30 MBA programs all tied for 
first place in the rankings. We allow the Business Week ranking to rank MBA programs among 
those efficient programs. 
Focusing on the global DEA efficiency ranking, Dartmouth (-36), Texas -- Austin (-33), 
Arizona (-32), Indiana (-31),  UVA (-29),  UCLA (-29),  Georgia (-29),  Columbia (-27),  Stanford 
(-27), UC -- Berkeley (-26), Penn State (-22), and Washington University (-21) drop 20 or more 
positions from their Business Week results. For example, Dartmouth falls from 10th to 46th, a loss of 
36 places. At the same time, Clark -- Atlanta (24), Boston University (23), Minnesota (22), Wake 
Forest (21), UC -- Irvine (20), and Thunderbird (20) rise 20 or more places when moving to the 
global DEA efficiency ranking. Finally, note that the overall ranking leaves Pennsylvania, 
Northwestern, Chicago, Michigan, and Harvard unchanged in their ranking. Columbia, which 
ranked 6th in the Business Week ranking, falls to a 33rd ranking, a loss of 27 positions. The MBA 
programs with the most inefficiency include Georgia, Penn State, Florida, Arizona, and UC -- 
Davis with global inefficiencies of 54%, 49%, 47%, 47%, and 45%, respectively.15 
Finally, we combine the rankings based on the raw output and input data (i.e., Table 4, 
column 3) with the ranking based on the DEA efficiency (i.e., Table 5, column 3), using a simple 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
MBA programs seems to work well for all outputs and every input, except the faculty-student ratio. 
13 Spearman rank correlations between the Business Week ranking and our output-oriented, input-oriented, and 
global efficiency rankings equal 0.55, 0.46, and 0.52, respectively. 
14 When the efficiency scores equal each other, then the ranking reverts to the order contained in the Business Week 
ranking. 
15 In each case, the MBA programs exhibit inefficiency in both the output- and input-oriented efficiency measure. 
But, also in each case, output-oriented inefficiency exceeds the input-oriented inefficiency. That finding also holds 
for 24 of the 31 MBA programs that experience some inefficiency. That is, generally MBA programs can do a bit 
more to improve efficiency in outputs relative to inputs. 
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average.16 17 Table 6 reports the findings.  
Focusing on the combined ranking, Arizona (-28), Texas -- Austin (-21), Indiana (-21), 
Georgia (-21), and Notre Dame (-20) drop 20 or more positions from their Business Week results. 
For example, Arizona falls from 26th to 54th, a loss of 28 places. At the same time, UC -- Irvine 
(28), Minnesota (26), Rochester (23), Vanderbilt (21), and Clark -- Atlanta (20) rise 20 or more 
places when moving to the overall output ranking. Note that the overall ranking moves 
Northwestern into the number one spot, followed in order by Pennsylvania, Michigan, Chicago, 
and Duke.  
4. Conclusion 
The ranking of MBA programs by Business Week provides important information for employers, 
students, and program administrators. That ranking, however, mixes the responses of students and 
employers together, giving an overall evaluation of the MBA programs. Students, employers, and 
program administrators possess different interests that should reflect different characteristics in 
their individual ranking schemes. This paper provides different ranking schemes for these three 
different groups. 
The Business Week ranking also relies on the perceptions of the participants in its MBA 
program survey. That is, survey respondents will use both objective and subjective factors in 
responding to the survey. Moreover, the survey respondents may not have accurate information on 
the objective facts. The subjective factors critically include the reputation of the program receiving 
a ranking. Reputations take much time and effort to build, but once established, they can persist for 
a long time, even if the effort to maintain the program after establishing its reputation slackens. 
                                                 
16 Note that the DEA efficiency rankings introduce to some extent the Business Week rankings based on their survey of 
students and employers, since ties in the efficiency score revert to that ranking. 
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Thus, MBA programs attempting to climb in the rankings will feel that the survey does not 
adequately reward the efforts that they have made to improve their program. In addition, MBA 
programs with strong reputations may continue to rank highly, even though the quality of the 
program has deteriorated. This paper provides rankings based on objective facts and compares 
those rankings to the Business Week rankings that incorporate subjective factors. 
The various rankings divide into three groups as follows. Student rankings reflect two 
outputs – the gain in income from pre- to post-MBA program adjusted for the cost of attending the 
program and the average number of job offers received. Employer rankings reflect four inputs –the 
faculty student ratio, the average GMAT score, the rejection percentage, and expenditure per 
student for the programs. Finally, the MBA program administrator rankings reflect both the outputs 
and the inputs. In addition, recognizing that program administrators run a “production process,” the 
paper also reports MBA program rankings based on “production efficiency,” where inputs produce 
outputs.18 
In sum, some MBA programs rise and others fall dramatically in the objective rankings as 
compared to the Business Week rankings. Tables 2 to 6 report the movement of MBA programs in 
the rankings relative to the Business Week rankings. Average differences between the Business 
Week ranking and each of our rankings (not reported) generate the following observations. First, 
Arizona (-19.8),  Wisconsin-Madison (-17.4),  Dartmouth (-17.2),  Texas- Austin (-15.2),  Indiana 
(-14.4),  Notre Dame (-13.6),   Georgia (-12.8),   UC -- Berkeley (-12.4),   UCLA (-12.2),   Babson 
(-12),   Illinois -- Urbana-Champaign (-11.4),   Penn State (-10.8),   Pittsburgh (-10.8),   and   Iowa 
(-10.4) average a fall of 10 or more places in the rankings. For example, Arizona, which ranks 26th 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17 Spearman rank correlation between the Business Week ranking and our combined ranking equals 0.74. 
18 The efficiency numbers come from Ray and Jeon (2003) who provide details about the calculation of the 
efficiency numbers. 
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in the Business Week ranking,  falls 26 places in our output ranking, 0 places in our input ranking, 
13 places in our combined output and input ranking, 32 places in our production-efficiency 
ranking, and 28 places in our combined output-input ranking and the production-efficiency 
ranking. That generates a simple average decline of 19.8 places. Second, UC -- Irvine (25.8), 
Minnesota (24.6), Rochester (19.6), Vanderbilt (19), Washington -- Seattle (18.2), Tulane (16.8), 
Clark -- Atlanta (16.6), Georgia Tech (14.4), Michigan State (13.6), Case Western (12.4) MIT 
(10.2), and UC -- Davis (10) average a rise of 10 or more places in the rankings. For example, UC -
- Irvine, which ranks 47th in the Business Week ranking, rises 23 places in our output ranking, 29 
places in our input ranking, 29 places in our combined output and input ranking, 20 places in our 
production-efficiency ranking, and 28 places in our combined output-input ranking and the 
production-efficiency ranking. Finally, some MBA programs do not change their rankings much 
relative to the Business Week ranking.  Cornell (-1.8),   BYU (-1.4),   Northwestern (-0.6), 
Michigan (-0.4), UNC (-0.2), Thunderbird (-0.2), SUNY -- Buffalo (0.2), Duke (0.4), Florida (0.4), 
and NYU (1.4) all average a fall or rise of less than two places. For example, UNC, which ranks 
19th in the Business Week ranking, does not change in our output ranking, falls 10 places in our 
input ranking, falls 5 places in our combined output and input ranking, rises 8 places in our 
production-efficiency ranking, and rises 6 places in our combined output-input ranking and the 
production-efficiency ranking. 
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APPENDIX: 
 
Outputs and Inputs Definitions 
 
Output 1:  gain = average post MBA salary  + annuity value of first year compensation -  
average pre MBA salary - 2 years times the annuity value of tuition and 
fee – including room & board  
 
where  
 
(1) annuity value of first year compensation includes average signing bonus and 
average other compensation; interest rate is equal to 5% for the next 25 years  
 
(2) 2 years *annuity value of tuition and fee includes room & board (that is, 
Annual Out-of-State Tuition*probability(out-of-state)+ Annual In-State 
Tuition*[1-Probability(out of state)]+Room & Board) and also making 
annuity values by using 5% interest rate for the next 25 years 
 
Output 2:  jobs = job offers by graduation 
        = Average Job Offers per student * the percentage of graduates with job  
            offers 
 
 
Input 1:  f/s = faculty- student ratio  
     = (resident faculty+0.5 visiting faculty) / (full time student + 0.5 part time 
         student) 
 
Input 2:  gmat = average GMAT score 
 
Input 3:  %reject = 100 – selectivity (applicants accepted), unit: percentage  
 
Input 4:  ex/stud = 1998/99 school budget / enrollment 
where enrollment = full time student + 0.5 * part time student 
 
Input 5:  %male = 100 – female enrollment percentage, unit: percentage 
 
Input 6:  %US = 100 – international enrollment percentage, unit: percentage 
 
Source: http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/index.html. 
 
Global Efficiency Measurement: Simple Example 
 
Technical efficiency of a firm falls below 100%, when it is possible to increase any of its outputs 
without either lowering any other output or increasing any of its inputs. Similarly, a fully 
efficient firm cannot lower any of its inputs without at the same time either increasing some 
other input or lowering some output. Clearly, larger possible decreases in inputs or increased in 
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outputs imply a lower firm efficiency. Because decreasing any input and/or increasing any 
output are desirable, the global efficiency measure incorporates both the input-saving and 
output-augmenting aspects of efficiency. Consider the following simple example, where four 
firms each use two inputs to produce two outputs. The input-output data of the firms are shown 
in the Table below. 
 
Table 1A: Input-Output Data 
 Firm A Firm B Firm C Firm D 
Input 1 5 6 4 4 
Input 2 8 9 8 10 
Output 1 3 3 4 5 
Output 2 5 4 5 7 
 
Firm A uses less of both inputs than B, while producing the same quantity of output 1 but 
a greater quantity of output 2. Firm C, on the other hand, produces more of both outputs, while 
using no more of input 2 and a lower quantity of input 1 than firm B does. Thus, both A and C 
prove more efficient than B. In contrast, Firm D produces greater quantities of both outputs and a 
lower quantity of input 1, but more of input 2 than B. Hence, we cannot directly compare the 
efficiency of B and D. 
 
Compare B with A. If B could act like A, it could lower input 1 by 16.67% and input 2 by 
11.11%, an average reduction of 13.89%. At the same time, output 2 could increase by 25% 
while output 1 does not change, an average increase in output of 12.5%. Thus, a global measure 
of the efficiency of firm B equals 
 
  GBA = .7654.0125.1
8611.0
125.01
1389.01 ==+
−
 
 
Now, compare B with C. In this case, B can lower input 1 by 33.33% and input 2 by 
11.11%, an average reduction in inputs of 22.22%. Output 1 can increase by 33.33% and output 
2 by 25%, an average increase in outputs of 29.17%. Thus, using C as the benchmark, the global 
efficiency measure of B equals 
 
  GBC = .6022.02917.1
7778.0
2917.0
2222.01 ==+
−
1  
 
Because, the input-output bundle is a feasible combination, the efficiency level of firm B cannot 
exceed 0.6022. 
 
So far, we assumed that only all actually observed input-output combinations are 
feasible. Assume instead that any weighted average of the observed input-output bundles is also 
feasible. In that case, the simple average of the outputs and inputs of firms C and D equal 4.5 
units of output 1 and 6 units of output 2 producible from 4 units of input 1 and 9 units of input 2. 
This hypothetical bundle generates a 33% decline in input 1, but no change in input 2 compared 
to firm B. At the same time, both outputs increase by 50%. Thus, a 16.5% average decline in 
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inputs and 50% average increase in outputs occur, based on the hypothetical firm that is a simple 
average of firms C and D. Thus, the global efficiency of B relative to this hypothetical firm 
equals 
 
  GBCD = .5555.05.1
835.0
5.01
165.01 ==+
−
 
 
Because this is the lowest value of the global efficiency measure of B, we use the average of C 
and D as the appropriate benchmark. 
 
In this simple example, the benchmark emerges from a simple search. In more complex 
problems, an appropriate mathematical programming model selects the optimal weights for 
constructing the benchmark input-output bundle (see Ray and Jeon, 2003). 
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Table 1: Business School Data 
 
Rank School Name gain jobs f/s gmat %reject ex/stud %male %US 
 Tier 1: Top 25 Averages 34,897 3.0 0.141 667 79 58,971 70 72 
 Tier 2: Second 25 Averages 30,126 2.5 0.211 629 62 39,782 70 72 
 Tier 3: Last 11 Averages 28,548 2.4 0.214 607 57 62,320 66 74 
1 Pennsylvania (Wharton) 32,262 3.1 0.041 685 87 109,184 71 69 
2 Northwestern (Kellogg) 35,172 3.3 0.091 695 86 70,270 68 76 
3 Chicago 33,904 3.3 0.070 690 76 49,148 78 77 
4 Michigan 39,531 3.4 0.116 672 78 70,648 72 74 
5 Harvard 27,616 3.7 0.130 689 87 111,049 70 74 
6 Columbia 34,198 2.8 0.118 680 88 62,305 64 72 
7 Duke (Fuqua) 41,123 3.1 0.136 664 83 66,322 67 75 
8 Cornell (Johnson) 36,783 3.1 0.090 647 72 48,527 74 68 
9 Stanford 30,179 3.4 0.118 722 93 67,114 71 71 
10 Dartmouth (Tuck) 29,889 2.6 0.106 671 88 66,756 71 76 
11 UVA (Darden) 40,022 2.6 0.142 685 85 72,784 70 79 
12 UCLA (Anderson) 30,477 2.6 0.099 690 86 49,451 72 76 
13 NYU (Stern) 43,354 2.5 0.1358 675 82 57,697 62 66 
14 Carnegie Mellon 43,376 3.5 0.162 654 70 59,675 76 61 
15 MIT (Sloan) 41,206 3.5 0.134 690 87 79,096 73 63 
16 UC -- Berkeley 34,906 2.2 0.152 674 89 44,015 62 66 
17 Washington University (Olin) 34,739 3 0.166 624 67 67,486 74 69 
18 Texas -- Austin 30,365 2.9 0.255 661 77 49,214 75 78 
19 UNC (Kenan-Flagler) 33,762 2.8 0.162 642 76 21,142 73 79 
20 Yale 42,775 2.8 0.123 682 75 56,970 68 70 
21 Indiana (Kelley) 33,149 2.7 0.259 635 60 84,201 72 81 
22 Maryland (Smith) 31,288 3.2 0.147 653 79 24,332 64 61 
23 Wisconsin -- Madison 22,273 2.7 0.172 613 53 19,792 69 68 
24 Purdue (Krannert) 35,638 4.1 0.210 623 75 27,378 74 64 
25 USC (Marshall) 34,445 2.6 0.182 650 74 39,708 71 77 
26 Arizona (Eller) 24,863 2.4 0.306 637 78 59,701 64 82 
27 Arizona State 28,795 2.6 0.098 628 58 16,850 70 81 
28 Babson (Olin) 28,527 2.2 0.131 634 58 12,830 65 69 
29 BYU (Marriott) 41,294 2.4 0.256 639 58 28,187 78 82 
30 Emory (Goizueta) 31,862 2.4 0.137 640 64 62,791 67 75 
31 Georgetown 36,750 2.6 0.161 637 65 30,470 65 67 
32 Georgia (Terry) 28,516 2.2 0.548 640 75 129,299 80 80 
33 Illinois -- Urbana/Champaign 26,196 2.6 0.267 612 55 20,520 70 56 
34 Iowa 32,793 2.5 0.251 613 73 30,975 75 65 
35 Michigan State (Broad) 33,154 3.7 0.451 628 74 62,295 72 62 
36 Notre Dame 28,668 2.7 0.323 613 43 71,786 72 75 
37 Ohio State (Fisher) 28,632 2.5 0.246 642 73 19,922 71 76 
38 Penn State (Smeal) 29,896 2.1 0.405 618 75 66,926 74 77 
39 Pittsburgh (Katz) 22,119 2 0.139 641 51 28,971 69 59 
40 Rice (Jones) 30,290 3 0.153 632 52 39,994 71 83 
41 Rochester (Simon) 36,797 2.4 0.097 652 67 39,374 76 52 
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42 SMU (Cox) 30,029 2.4 0.148 636 68 36,348 68 78 
Table 1: Business School Data (continued) 
 
Rank School Name gain jobs f/s gmat %reject ex/stud %male %US 
43 South Carolina (Darla Moore) 30,730 1.8 0.185 604 40 9,400 67 75 
44 Tennessee -- Knoxville 27,237 3.1 0.278 615 68 3,611 70 88 
45 Texas A&M 24,347 2.0 0.157 619 67 54,054 60 72 
46 Thunderbird 28,026 1.5 0.076 601 32 42,989 63 53 
47 UC -- Irvine 30,147 3.3 0.117 650 73 31,986 73 71 
48 Vanderbilt (Owen) 33,859 2.6 0.115 635 58 45,650 71 73 
49 Wake Forest (Babcock) 27,938 2.2 0.082 633 55 28,175 76 81 
50 William & Mary 31,689 2.5 0.158 630 65 21,452 58 73 
51 Boston College 24,185 2.0 0.140 622 55 14,414 68 76 
52 Boston University 30,980 2.1 0.129 608 63 25,271 66 59 
53 Case Western (Weatherhead) 26,607 2.5 0.124 614 60 39,839 64 62 
54 Clark -- Atlanta 37,634 2.6 0.242 430 30 22,642 40 90 
55 Florida (Warrington) 21,634 2.5 0.245 610 58 73,772 72 85 
56 Georgia Tech (DuPree) 28,289 2.9 0.290 632 55 173,054 72 69 
57 Minnesota (Carlson) 32,939 3.2 0.189 620 54 54,276 68 80 
58 SUNY -- Buffalo 26,170 1.5 0.155 598 59 23,595 68 68 
59 Tulane (Freeman) 34,169 2.4 0.386 632 58 127,660 73 58 
60 UC -- Davis 24,223 2.3 0.257 663 72 38,701 61 90 
61 Washington -- Seattle 27,200 2.2 0.197 647 68 92,295 76 73 
Note: The data include two outputs – gain and jobs – and six inputs – f/s, gmat, ex/stud, %male, and %US. The 
outputs measure the value added and the number of job offers, respectively. The inputs measure the 
faculty-student ratio, the GMAT score, the percentage rejection, the expenditure-student ratio, the 
percentage male applicants, and the percentage US applicants. See the appendix for more details. 
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Table 2: Business Schools Ranked by Outputs 
 
Rank School Name gain jobs Outputs Difference 
1 Pennsylvania (Wharton) 27 13 16 -15 
2 Northwestern (Kellogg) 14 8 6 -4 
3 Chicago 20 9 10 -7 
4 Michigan 8 6 3 1 
5 Harvard 49 2 26 -21 
6 Columbia 18 21 15 -9 
7 Duke (Fuqua) 6 14 5 2 
8 Cornell (Johnson) 11 15 7 1 
9 Stanford 36 7 18 -9 
10 Dartmouth (Tuck) 40 27 37 -27 
11 UVA (Darden) 7 28 12 -1 
12 UCLA (Anderson) 33 29 31 -19 
13 NYU (Stern) 2 36 14 -1 
14 Carnegie Mellon 1 4 1 13 
15 MIT (Sloan) 5 5 2 13 
16 UC -- Berkeley 15 49 33 -17 
17 Washington University (Olin) 16 17 11 6 
18 Texas -- Austin 34 19 27 -9 
19 UNC (Kenan-Flagler) 22 22 19 0 
20 Yale 3 23 8 12 
21 Indiana (Kelley) 24 24 25 -4 
22 Maryland (Smith) 30 11 17 5 
23 Wisconsin -- Madison 59 25 43 -20 
24 Purdue (Krannert) 13 1 4 20 
25 USC (Marshall) 17 30 22 3 
26 Arizona (Eller) 55 42 52 -26 
27 Arizona State 41 31 40 -13 
28 Babson (Olin) 44 50 50 -22 
29 BYU (Marriott) 4 43 23 6 
30 Emory (Goizueta) 28 44 41 -11 
31 Georgetown 12 32 20 11 
32 Georgia (Terry) 45 51 51 -19 
33 Illinois -- Urbana/Champaign 53 33 45 -12 
34 Iowa 26 37 32 2 
35 Michigan State (Broad) 23 3 9 26 
36 Notre Dame 42 26 38 -2 
37 Ohio State (Fisher) 43 38 42 -5 
38 Penn State (Smeal) 39 54 49 -11 
39 Pittsburgh (Katz) 60 56 60 -21 
40 Rice (Jones) 35 18 28 12 
41 Rochester (Simon) 10 45 29 12 
42 SMU (Cox) 38 46 44 -2 
43 South Carolina (Darla Moore) 32 59 47 -4 
44 Tennessee -- Knoxville 50 16 34 10 
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45 Texas A&M 56 57 58 -13 
Table 2: Business Schools Ranked by Outputs (continued) 
 
Rank School Name gain jobs Outputs Difference 
46 Thunderbird 47 60 57 -11 
47 UC -- Irvine 37 10 24 23 
48 Vanderbilt (Owen) 21 34 30 18 
49 Wake Forest (Babcock) 48 52 53 -4 
50 William & Mary 29 39 39 11 
51 Boston College 58 58 61 -10 
52 Boston University 31 55 46 6 
53 Case Western (Weatherhead) 52 40 48 5 
54 Clark -- Atlanta 9 35 21 33 
55 Florida (Warrington) 61 41 54 1 
56 Georgia Tech (DuPree) 46 20 35 21 
57 Minnesota (Carlson) 25 12 13 44 
58 SUNY -- Buffalo 54 61 59 -1 
59 Tulane (Freeman) 19 47 36 23 
60 UC -- Davis 57 48 56 4 
61 Washington -- Seattle 51 53 55 6 
Note: See Table 1. The Outputs column comes by a simple average of the gain and 
jobs columns with a ranking of the resulting average numbers from 1 to 61. The 
difference column measures the difference between the Business Week ranking (column 
1) and the Outputs ranking (column 5). 
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Table 3: Business Schools Ranked by Inputs 
 
Rank School Name f/s gmat %reject ex/stud Inputs Difference
1 Pennsylvania (Wharton) 1 7 5 5 1 0 
2 Northwestern (Kellogg) 6 2 8 13 2 0 
3 Chicago 2 3 17 30 10 -7 
4 Michigan 12 13 14 12 9 -5 
5 Harvard 19 6 6 4 4 1 
6 Columbia 14 10 3 20 7 -1 
7 Duke (Fuqua) 23 15 11 18 12 -5 
8 Cornell (Johnson) 5 23 28 31 16 -8 
9 Stanford 15 1 1 15 3 6 
10 Dartmouth (Tuck) 10 14 4 17 6 4 
11 UVA (Darden) 27 8 10 10 11 0 
12 UCLA (Anderson) 9 4 9 28 8 4 
13 NYU (Stern) 22 11 12 24 13 0 
14 Carnegie Mellon 37 18 30 23 20 -6 
15 MIT (Sloan) 21 5 7 8 5 10 
16 UC -- Berkeley 30 12 2 33 15 1 
17 Washington University (Olin) 38 44 34 14 28 -11 
18 Texas -- Austin 49 17 16 29 23 -5 
19 UNC (Kenan-Flagler) 36 25 18 53 29 -10 
20 Yale 16 9 19 25 14 6 
21 Indiana (Kelley) 52 34 41 7 31 -10 
22 Maryland (Smith) 28 19 13 49 21 1 
23 Wisconsin -- Madison 39 52 55 56 58 -35 
24 Purdue (Krannert) 44 45 20 47 44 -20 
25 USC (Marshall) 40 21 23 37 25 0 
26 Arizona (Eller) 56 31 15 22 26 0 
27 Arizona State 8 42 44 57 41 -14 
28 Babson (Olin) 20 36 45 59 47 -19 
29 BYU (Marriott) 50 30 46 45 53 -24 
30 Emory (Goizueta) 24 28 39 19 22 8 
31 Georgetown 35 32 37 43 37 -6 
32 Georgia (Terry) 61 29 21 2 24 8 
33 Illinois -- Urbana/Champaign 53 55 50 54 59 -26 
34 Iowa 48 53 25 42 51 -17 
35 Michigan State (Broad) 60 43 24 21 38 -3 
36 Notre Dame 57 54 58 11 54 -18 
37 Ohio State (Fisher) 47 26 26 55 43 -6 
38 Penn State (Smeal) 59 49 22 16 35 3 
39 Pittsburgh (Katz) 25 27 57 44 42 -3 
40 Rice (Jones) 31 38 56 35 48 -8 
41 Rochester (Simon) 7 20 35 38 17 24 
42 SMU (Cox) 29 33 31 40 30 12 
43 South Carolina (Darla Moore) 41 58 59 60 60 -17 
44 Tennessee -- Knoxville 54 50 32 61 57 -13 
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45 Texas A&M 33 48 36 27 34 11 
Table 3: Business Schools Ranked by Inputs (continued) 
 
Rank School Name f/s gmat %reject ex/stud Inputs Difference
46 Thunderbird 3 59 60 34 45 1 
47 UC -- Irvine 13 22 27 41 18 29 
48 Vanderbilt (Owen) 11 35 47 32 27 21 
49 Wake Forest (Babcock) 4 37 51 46 33 16 
50 William & Mary 34 41 38 52 50 0 
51 Boston College 26 46 52 58 55 -4 
52 Boston University 18 57 40 48 49 3 
53 Case Western (Weatherhead) 17 51 42 36 36 17 
54 Clark -- Atlanta 45 61 61 51 61 -7 
55 Florida (Warrington) 46 56 48 9 46 9 
56 Georgia Tech (DuPree) 55 39 53 1 39 17 
57 Minnesota (Carlson) 42 47 54 26 52 5 
58 SUNY -- Buffalo 32 60 43 50 56 2 
59 Tulane (Freeman) 58 40 49 3 40 19 
60 UC -- Davis 51 16 29 39 32 28 
61 Washington -- Seattle 43 24 33 6 19 42 
Note: See Table 1. The Inputs column comes by a simple average of the f/s, gmat, %reject ,and ex/stud 
columns with a ranking of the resulting average numbers from 1 to 61. The difference column measures the 
difference between the Business Week ranking (column 1) and the Inputs ranking (column 7). 
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Table 4: Business Schools Ranked by Outputs and Inputs 
 
Rank School Name Outputs Inputs Combined Difference
1 Pennsylvania (Wharton) 16 1 4 -3 
2 Northwestern (Kellogg) 6 2 2 0 
3 Chicago 10 10 6 -3 
4 Michigan 3 9 3 1 
5 Harvard 26 4 14 -9 
6 Columbia 15 7 9 -3 
7 Duke (Fuqua) 5 12 5 2 
8 Cornell (Johnson) 7 16 11 -3 
9 Stanford 18 3 7 2 
10 Dartmouth (Tuck) 37 6 19 -9 
11 UVA (Darden) 12 11 12 -1 
12 UCLA (Anderson) 31 8 16 -4 
13 NYU (Stern) 14 13 13 0 
14 Carnegie Mellon 1 20 8 6 
15 MIT (Sloan) 2 5 1 14 
16 UC -- Berkeley 33 15 23 -7 
17 Washington University (Olin) 11 28 17 0 
18 Texas -- Austin 27 23 26 -8 
19 UNC (Kenan-Flagler) 19 29 24 -5 
20 Yale 8 14 10 10 
21 Indiana (Kelley) 25 31 27 -6 
22 Maryland (Smith) 17 21 15 7 
23 Wisconsin -- Madison 43 58 55 -32 
24 Purdue (Krannert) 4 44 25 -1 
25 USC (Marshall) 22 25 21 4 
26 Arizona (Eller) 52 26 39 -13 
27 Arizona State 40 41 40 -13 
28 Babson (Olin) 50 47 53 -25 
29 BYU (Marriott) 23 53 36 -7 
30 Emory (Goizueta) 41 22 30 0 
31 Georgetown 20 37 28 3 
32 Georgia (Terry) 51 24 35 -3 
33 Illinois -- Urbana/Champaign 45 59 58 -25 
34 Iowa 32 51 42 -8 
35 Michigan State (Broad) 9 38 22 13 
36 Notre Dame 38 54 50 -14 
37 Ohio State (Fisher) 42 43 45 -8 
38 Penn State (Smeal) 49 35 43 -5 
39 Pittsburgh (Katz) 60 42 56 -17 
40 Rice (Jones) 28 48 37 3 
41 Rochester (Simon) 29 17 20 21 
42 SMU (Cox) 44 30 32 10 
43 South Carolina (Darla Moore) 47 60 59 -16 
44 Tennessee -- Knoxville 34 57 49 -5 
 27
45 Texas A&M 58 34 51 -6 
Table 4: Business Schools Ranked by Outputs and Inputs (continued) 
 
Rank School Name Outputs Inputs Combined Difference
46 Thunderbird 57 45 57 -11 
47 UC -- Irvine 24 18 18 29 
48 Vanderbilt (Owen) 30 27 29 19 
49 Wake Forest (Babcock) 53 33 46 3 
50 William & Mary 39 50 48 2 
51 Boston College 61 55 61 -10 
52 Boston University 46 49 52 0 
53 Case Western (Weatherhead) 48 36 44 9 
54 Clark -- Atlanta 21 61 41 13 
55 Florida (Warrington) 54 46 54 1 
56 Georgia Tech (DuPree) 35 39 33 23 
57 Minnesota (Carlson) 13 52 31 26 
58 SUNY -- Buffalo 59 56 60 -2 
59 Tulane (Freeman) 36 40 38 21 
60 UC -- Davis 56 32 47 13 
61 Washington -- Seattle 55 19 34 27 
Note: See Table 1. The Combined column comes by a simple average of the outputs 
and inputs columns with a ranking of those average numbers from 1 to 61. The 
difference column measures the difference between the Business Week ranking (column 
1) and the combined ranking (column 5). 
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Table 5: Business Schools Ranked by DEA Outputs and Inputs 
 
Rank School Name Output Input Global Difference
1 Pennsylvania (Wharton)a 1 1 1 0 
2 Northwestern (Kellogg)a 2 2 2 0 
3 Chicagoa 3 3 3 0 
4 Michigana 4 4 4 0 
5 Harvarda 5 5 5 0 
6 Columbia 32 47 33 -27 
7 Duke (Fuqua)a 6 6 6 1 
8 Cornell (Johnson)a 7 7 7 1 
9 Stanford 35 41 36 -27 
10 Dartmouth (Tuck) 43 48 46 -36 
11 UVA (Darden) 36 51 40 -29 
12 UCLA (Anderson) 41 42 41 -29 
13 NYU (Stern)a 8 8 8 5 
14 Carnegie Mellona 9 9 9 5 
15 MIT (Sloan)a 10 10 10 5 
16 UC -- Berkeley 42 45 42 -26 
17 Washington University (Olin) 39 39 38 -21 
18 Texas -- Austin 51 52 51 -33 
19 UNC (Kenan-Flagler)a 11 11 11 8 
20 Yalea 12 12 12 8 
21 Indiana (Kelley) 44 55 52 -31 
22 Maryland (Smith)a 13 13 13 9 
23 Wisconsin – Madisona 14 14 14 9 
24 Purdue (Krannert)a 15 15 15 9 
25 USC (Marshall) 46 43 44 -19 
26 Arizona (Eller) 55 58 58 -32 
27 Arizona Statea 16 16 16 11 
28 Babson (Olin)a 17 17 17 11 
29 BYU (Marriott)a 18 18 18 11 
30 Emory (Goizueta) 47 44 45 -15 
31 Georgetowna 19 19 19 12 
32 Georgia (Terry) 58 61 61 -29 
33 Illinois -- Urbana/Champaigna 20 20 20 13 
34 Iowa 53 40 48 -14 
35 Michigan State (Broad)a 21 21 21 14 
36 Notre Dame 40 56 50 -14 
37 Ohio State (Fisher) 52 34 47 -10 
38 Penn State (Smeal) 59 57 60 -22 
39 Pittsburgh (Katz) 48 32 39 0 
40 Rice (Jones)a 22 22 22 18 
41 Rochester (Simon)a 23 23 23 18 
42 SMU (Cox) 50 35 43 -1 
43 South Carolina (Darla Moore)a 24 24 24 19 
44 Tennessee – Knoxvillea 25 25 25 19 
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45 Texas A&M 54 46 55 -10 
Table 5: Business Schools Ranked by DEA Outputs and Inputs (continued) 
 
Rank School Name Output Input Global Difference 
46 Thunderbirda 26 26 26 20 
47 UC -- Irvinea 27 27 27 20 
48 Vanderbilt (Owen) 34 37 32 16 
49 Wake Forest (Babcock)a 28 28 28 21 
50 William & Mary 31 38 31 19 
51 Boston College 45 29b 37 14 
52 Boston Universitya 29 30b 29 23 
53 Case Western (Weatherhead) 37 36 34 19 
54 Clark -- Atlantaa 30 31b 30 24 
55 Florida (Warrington) 61 53 59 -4 
56 Georgia Tech (DuPree) 49 59 54 2 
57 Minnesota (Carlson) 33 49 35 22 
58 SUNY -- Buffalo 56 33 53 5 
59 Tulane (Freeman) 38 60 49 10 
60 UC -- Davis 57 54 57 3 
61 Washington -- Seattle 60 50 56 5 
Note: See Table 1. The Global column comes by a simple average of the Output and 
Input columns with a ranking of those average numbers from 1 to 61. The difference 
column measures the difference between the Business Week ranking (column 1) and the 
ranking in the Global ranking (column 5). 
a MBA programs that exhibit no inefficiency in the output-oriented, input-
oriented, and global measures of efficiency. 
b Boston College exhibit no inefficiency with respect to the input oriented  
measure of efficiency. Since Boston College ranks ahead of Boston University 
and Clark -- Atlanta in the Business Week ranking, it appears as 29 with Boston 
University and Clark -- Atlanta at 30 and 31 in the ranking by input-oriented 
efficiency measures. 
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Table 6: Business Schools Ranked by Indexed Outputs and Inputs, and DEA Outputs and 
Inputs 
 
Rank School Name Combined Global Ultimate Difference 
1 Pennsylvania (Wharton) 4 1 2 -1 
2 Northwestern (Kellogg) 2 2 1 1 
3 Chicago 6 3 4 -1 
4 Michigan 3 4 3 1 
5 Harvard 14 5 9 -4 
6 Columbia 9 33 15 -9 
7 Duke (Fuqua) 5 6 5 2 
8 Cornell (Johnson) 11 7 8 0 
9 Stanford 7 36 16 -7 
10 Dartmouth (Tuck) 19 46 28 -18 
11 UVA (Darden) 12 40 21 -10 
12 UCLA (Anderson) 16 41 25 -13 
13 NYU (Stern) 13 8 10 3 
14 Carnegie Mellon 8 9 7 7 
15 MIT (Sloan) 1 10 6 9 
16 UC -- Berkeley 23 42 29 -13 
17 Washington University (Olin) 17 38 23 -6 
18 Texas -- Austin 26 51 39 -21 
19 UNC (Kenan-Flagler) 24 11 13 6 
20 Yale 10 12 11 9 
21 Indiana (Kelley) 27 52 42 -21 
22 Maryland (Smith) 15 13 12 10 
23 Wisconsin -- Madison 55 14 32 -9 
24 Purdue (Krannert) 25 15 14 10 
25 USC (Marshall) 21 44 30 -5 
26 Arizona (Eller) 39 58 54 -28 
27 Arizona State 40 16 24 3 
28 Babson (Olin) 53 17 33 -5 
29 BYU (Marriott) 36 18 22 7 
30 Emory (Goizueta) 30 45 37 -7 
31 Georgetown 28 19 20 11 
32 Georgia (Terry) 35 61 53 -21 
33 Illinois -- Urbana/Champaign 58 20 40 -7 
34 Iowa 42 48 49 -15 
35 Michigan State (Broad) 22 21 17 18 
36 Notre Dame 50 50 56 -20 
37 Ohio State (Fisher) 45 47 51 -14 
38 Penn State (Smeal) 43 60 57 -19 
39 Pittsburgh (Katz) 56 39 52 -13 
40 Rice (Jones) 37 22 26 14 
41 Rochester (Simon) 20 23 18 23 
42 SMU (Cox) 32 43 38 4 
43 South Carolina (Darla Moore) 59 24 45 -2 
 31
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44 Tennessee -- Knoxville 49 25 35 9 
Table 6: Business Schools Ranked by Indexed Outputs and Inputs, and DEA Outputs and 
Inputs (continued) 
 
Rank School Name Combined Global Ultimate Difference 
45 Texas A&M 51 55 59 -14 
46 Thunderbird 57 26 46 0 
47 UC -- Irvine 18 27 19 28 
48 Vanderbilt (Owen) 29 32 27 21 
49 Wake Forest (Babcock) 46 28 36 13 
50 William & Mary 48 31 43 7 
51 Boston College 61 37 55 -4 
52 Boston University 52 29 44 8 
53 Case Western (Weatherhead) 44 34 41 12 
54 Clark -- Atlanta 41 30 34 20 
55 Florida (Warrington) 54 59 60 -5 
56 Georgia Tech (DuPree) 33 54 47 9 
57 Minnesota (Carlson) 31 35 31 26 
58 SUNY -- Buffalo 60 53 61 -3 
59 Tulane (Freeman) 38 49 48 11 
60 UC -- Davis 47 57 58 2 
61 Washington -- Seattle 34 56 50 11 
Note: See Table 1. The Ultimate column comes by a simple average of the Combined 
and Global columns with a ranking of those average numbers from 1 to 61. The 
difference column measures the difference between the Business Week ranking (column 
1) and the Ultimate ranking (column 5). 
 
